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Abstract 
This paper reviews the theoretical and practical issues surrounding the decentralization of 
responsibility for the provision of infrastructure to local governments in low income countries.  
The focus is on structural rather than management issues.  There is plenty of evidence that 
following the theory can lead to efficient outcomes under decentralization, but also plenty of 
evidence that the theory and the practice often diverge widely.  Seven policy rules that could 
support a successful decentralization of appropriate infrastructure services are drawn out of this 
review. 
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1. Introduction 
1. The theory of expenditure assignment tells us that, under the right circumstances, certain 
services, including the infrastructure needed to provide them, can be more efficiently provided 
by subnational governments.  At least in industrial countries, infrastructure investment is 
decentralized to a significant extent (Estache and Sinha 1995).  In OECD countries, even such 
big projects as ports and airports are often locally managed and funded (Bel and Fageda 2009).  
In the European Union, for example, the share of subnational investment in economic 
infrastructure is 60-70 percent in the older member states and 40 percent in the new member 
states; subnational shares in social investments (e.g., in schools and hospitals) are even higher 
(Kappeler et al. 2012). 
2. In low and middle income countries, economic theory provides less guidance to best 
practice.  This is mostly because the assumptions beneath the decentralization model do not fit 
the developing country setting as well. The result is a great deal of variation in the extent to 
which responsibility for infrastructure service delivery is assigned to local governments (Alm, 
2010).  In the countries included in Table 1, for instance, the equivalent of a large share of 
subnational own revenue is  devoted to infrastructure. In fact, the amount spent on infrastructure 
by subnational governments in Peru is greater than the amount they raise from own sources.  
 
Table 1. Public Investment and Decentralization in Latin America 
 
 
Country 
General 
Government 
Investment 
(% GDP) 
Subnational 
Government 
Investment 
(% GDP) 
Subnational 
As Share of 
Total (%) 
General 
Government 
Taxes 
(% GDP) 
Subnational 
Own 
Revenues 
(% GDP) 
Subnational 
As Share of 
Total (%) 
Argentina 1.3 1.1 84.6 30.8 5.6 18.2 
Colombia 1.9 1.3 68.4 15.9 2.9 18.2 
Chile 1.4 0.2 14.3 19.6 1.5 7.6 
Peru 2.4 1.2 50.0 17.4 0.8 5.0 
Sources and notes: Investment (average acquisition of fixed capital on accrual basis; data for 1995-2006) from de 
Mello (2012); Revenue (for 2008 only) from Gomez Sabaini and Jimenez (2012).  
 
3. Even in countries in which subnational governments are important investors in 
infrastructure, however, it is by no means obvious whether expenditures on infrastructure have 
been over-assigned or under-assigned to such governments, or whether the right expenditures 
have been devolved.
1
  The open question is whether a change in governance arrangements (or in 
the incentives to policy-makers that lie beneath these governance arrangements)  would lead to 
an improvement in the delivery of infrastructure services.
2
  The institutional arrangements in 
                                                          
1. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, many questions have been raised about the relationship between 
decentralization and public investment in a time of increasing budgetary pressure.  A useful recent survey of this 
literature may be found in Fernandez Llera (2012) but we do not discuss this issue in the present paper.  
2. For example, Afonso, Araujo and Junior (2005, 9) argue with respect to Brazil that “the shortage of investment 
in infrastructure is even more serious when we consider that an increasing, and already the major part of expenditure 
on capital formation by public sector authorities has become decentralized…. Institutionally, these regional 
governments do not have the competence to concede, regulate or carry out functions in the majority of actions and 
services that are classified as infrastructure related (with the exception of sanitation)….” 
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question include not only the structure of subnational governments but the nature of political 
representation, spending and revenue mobilization powers, borrowing restrictions and practices, 
the degree of autonomy in management, the design and implementation of intergovernmental 
transfer systems, and the accountability of governments at all levels to those for whom they 
presumably speak.   
4. This paper is a review of the theoretical and practical issues surrounding the 
decentralization of responsibility for infrastructure to local governments.  The focus is on local 
governments rather than provincial or state level governments in federations, and on structural 
issues rather than day-to-day management issues.  Management issues are important, of course, 
but may contribute little to productive infrastructure investment if the structure of local 
governance and finance is flawed.  In Section 2 of this paper , we define how we understand 
‘decentralization’ and ‘infrastructure’, discuss the normative principles that guide the assignment 
of responsibility for delivering infrastructure services, and note how the practice observed in 
most countries deviates from what theory appears to suggest.    Section 3 of the paper then 
considers a number of ways in which theory and practice might be better reconciled, 
emphasizing in particular the need to consider the broader governance context of each country.  
Section 4 considers more briefly two special “asymmetrical” issues of importance in many 
developing countries: infrastructure provision in metropolitan and remote rural areas and 
regional equity.  Section 5 concludes with a summary of the policy directions suggested by this 
review. 
 
2. Infrastructure and Expenditure Assignment 
5. Though” infrastructure” is a term commonly used in the development economics 
literature, it is not always defined, and in fact can take on different meanings.    The term ‘public 
infrastructure investment’ for instance is sometimes used to denote government investment, even 
though it also includes investment by publicly owned companies such as utilities.  As a rule, 
however, such corporate investment is recorded as government (rather than corporate) 
investment only if the revenues of such firms cover less than half their production costs: that is, 
the source of funding, not the formal ownership, determines how investment is classified (Alegre 
et al 2008).  More importantly for the present argument, ‘infrastructure investment’ itself is 
sometimes used  broadly to include not only physical capital formation but also expenditure 
considered to increase human capital formation, for example, on education.  Even excluding such 
expenditure, it is often useful to think of government capital formation as falling  into several 
distinct categories.  Alegre et al (2008), for example, distinguish four such categories in terms of 
the functions served by such investment: (1) Redistribution (housing, recreation, social 
protection), (2) Public Goods (defense, environment, order and safety, general public services), 
(3) Hospitals and Schools (health and education), and what they call simply (4) Infrastructure, 
that is traditional public works projects, of which by far the most important example in 
quantitative terms in most countries is transport. As they argue (Alegre et al. 2008, 26-27):  
“This type of government investment has the most direct economic impact 
by reducing firms’ production and transaction costs. The economic impact 
of government investment in health and education sectors is more long-
term and less direct in character, as it facilitates the building up and 
maintenance of the economy’s stock of human capital.  Investment in 
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public goods affects the economy’s allocative efficiency indirectly through 
framework conditions for productive activity.  Finally, redistribution 
affects the economy’s income distribution rather than allocative or 
productive efficiency per se.” 
6. Although one may quibble with some of these statements, this classification is 
nonetheless useful in that it distinguishes clearly between investments that have direct and 
indirect effects on the level and nature of economic activity. It also makes it clear that the most 
relevant government investment from this perspective usually takes the form of ‘network’ 
investment (e.g. transportation and communication) rather than ‘point’ investment (e.g. hospitals, 
administrative buildings), even though the former is also geographically specific in its location 
and the latter may often also be part of a network from some perspectives (e.g. primary health 
centers feeding into hospitals or elementary schools into secondary schools).  
7. For the most part, the focus in this paper is on the narrower definition of infrastructure 
investment as the construction, operation, and maintenance of the long-lived physical assets 
required to deliver such specific public services as land transportation (highways, roads, streets, 
bridges, and ancillary services such as street lighting, street cleaning, signage, etc.), potable 
water (supply, distribution), wastewater management (sewerage, disposal), and solid waste 
collection and disposal (including hazardous waste).
3
   Much of the discussion – for example, 
with respect to public-private partnerships -- may also apply to other ‘utility’ services such as 
electric power generation and distribution, natural gas distribution, airports and airways, ports 
and navigation control systems, railroads and public transit systems, irrigation, and 
telecommunications, as well as well as to the other types of investment mentioned by Alegre et 
al (2008).  For the most part in this paper, however, we focus on the simplest, most basic and 
arguably most important infrastructure investments usually assigned to decentralized 
governments – roads, water and sewerage, and solid waste disposal.4  Since infrastructure 
investments are, by definition, both located in a particular physical location and within the 
jurisdiction of one or more specific political jurisdictions, even with this restricted set of 
activities much the same wide range of factors must be considered as with a broader definition.  
8. Fiscal decentralization also requires definition. In this paper, we  interpret 
decentralization to mean the devolution of explicit authority and responsibility for a specific 
activity to a specific unit of government.  Even this definition is both too broad and too narrow 
                                                          
3. The IMF GFS data that underlies Table 1, for example, define capital investment as the acquisition of physical 
assets with a useful life longer than one year as well as improvements or rehabilitation that extend the life of the 
asset (Jacobs, 2009).  However, this definition does not include maintenance expenditure needed to make the asset 
functional during its life, let alone the operating expenditure needed to actually use the asset.  Assigning 
responsibility for maintenance to one level of government and for maintenance of ‘new investment’ to another as 
often done creates a serious moral hazard and is almost guaranteed to yield less than optimal results. The line 
between ‘maintenance’ and ‘rehabilitation’ like that between ‘operation’ and ‘maintenance’ is often hard to draw, 
but the fact is that not only are both operating and maintenance expenditure (O&M) essential for the delivery of 
public services but that such expenditure is usually considerably larger over the life of an asset than its initial capital 
cost (Estache 2010). For the most part, we shall therefore treat O&M directly related to utilizing physical assets as 
part of ‘infrastructure investment’: a broken water pipe, even if it was acquired yesterday, is not one that is going to 
deliver the right amount of water in the right quality to the right places. 
4. Although, for expositional purposes, we often label decentralized governments ‘local’ there are usually two 
(regional, local) and sometimes more levels of decentralized government.  We discuss later a few aspects of the 
important distinction, and relations, between different levels of subnational government.  
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for our purposes, however.  It is too broad in the sense that the ‘assignment’ of a particular 
discretionary power to a level of government is almost never simply an issue of drawing lines 
between broad classes of activity such as ‘water and sewers’ and ‘education’ and assigning each 
exclusively to one level of government.  As discussed below, each activity or function can be and 
usually is ‘unbundled’ in a number of ways.    At the same time, defining decentralization as 
simply equivalent to devolution is also too narrow because it excludes much of the important 
infrastructure investment undertaken by decentralized governments engaged in delivering 
delegated services such as health and education.  Although our principal focus here is on the 
provision of physical infrastructure (including O&M) by subnational governments to whom the 
task of ensuring that the associated services are provided, inevitably some of the specific 
instances to which we refer and some of the arguments we make will stretch these boundaries to 
varying extents.  
 
The Basic Rule of Expenditure Assignment: Efficiency 
9. The basic rule of efficient expenditure assignment is to devolve each function to the 
lowest level of government consistent with its efficient performance.   This idea is expressed in 
the “decentralization theorem” (Oates 1972).  So long as there are local variations in tastes and 
costs, there are potential efficiency gains from assigning responsibility for public sector activities 
to the lowest level of government possible. Under such an arrangement, local decision-makers 
will act on behalf of voters to decide what services are provided, to whom, and in what quantity 
and quality. The apt phase is that “people get what they want” under a decentralized system with 
the result that overall public welfare is enhanced.  A well-known example of this principle is the 
rule of “subsidiarity” in the European Union.5  
10. For some expenditure functions, however, assignment to the lowest level of government 
does not lead to a welfare gain.  The two primary reasons why a public function would not pass 
the decentralization test are the presence of externalities and economies of scale.   Although there 
are other ways to deal with such problems (such as intergovernmental transfers and private 
contracting), either might cause one to favor more centralized infrastructure spending, especially 
because many infrastructure projects are expensive, capital intensive and are characterized by 
spillover effects.  Nonetheless, as Table 1 illustrates, in at least some developing countries a 
large proportion of capital expenditures are made by subnational governments. One explanation 
might be the importance placed on satisfying local preferences.  Another explanation might be 
that fiscal centralization is not the only way to deal with economies of scale and spillover effects 
or such other commonly cited pro-centralization factors as corruption and administrative 
capacity.  Yet another explanation might be that there are overwhelming political economy 
considerations (e.g. regional equity concerns) for decentralizing more infrastructure investment 
than is strictly warranted by the conventional fiscal federalism literature.  
11. One way around the assignment problems that arise when externalities or economies of 
scale are present is unbundling.  This involves breaking the delivery of a function down into its 
subcomponents so that the most appropriate assignment can be made to local governments.  For 
example, expenditures can be disaggregated to sectors (e.g., education, health), services (e.g., 
                                                          
5. For an interesting comparison of the decentralization theorem and the subsidiarity principle, see Breton, 
Cassone, and Fraschini (1998).  
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primary curative care, primary education) or activities (e.g., policy and standards, planning, asset 
creation, operation, and maintenance and operation).  The World Bank (2007) has proposed 
unbundling service responsibilities for rural local governments in India by cross-classifying 
activities against sectors and services.  The result of such an approach is to provide clarity in 
expenditure assignment, but also to provide constituents with a more clear idea of who to hold 
accountable for what service.  
12. Boadway and Shah (2009) take a similar approach.  In their schema -- outlined in Table 2 
-- only water, sewer, refuse and fire protection are assigned to local governments, with local 
control over such local infrastructure (roads, water, sewage, irrigation) likely to be “…more cost-
effective as well as more suited to the needs of the users” (147).  In addition, although their 
enthusiasm for public enterprises in general is restrained, Boadway and Shah (2009) recognize 
that local control over public enterprises providing local utility and transportation services is also 
sensible, provided users are also local (148).  
13. Even in principle, however, matters are complicated for two reasons.  First, as already 
mentioned, there are often shared responsibilities for some services between different levels of 
government (national, state, and local).  As Table 2 shows, in the Boadway-Shah presentation 
such sharing is deemed appropriate not only with respect to police, highways, parks and 
recreation, education, health and social welfare but also even broader policy areas such as fiscal 
policy, regulation, and natural resources as well as, interestingly, direct foreign investment.  
Second, since “responsibility” may be thought of in several different ways – (Level 1) 
responsibility for policy, standards and oversight, (Level 2) responsibility for provision 
(financing) and administration, and (Level 3) responsibility for production and administration – 
to some extent the shared responsibility among levels of government may be divided along these 
lines. With respect to primary and secondary education, for example, it is not uncommon for a 
national Ministry of Education to be responsible for determining national standards to be met by 
schools, teachers and students, while regional (state) governments have the primary 
responsibility for financing education, and local (municipal) governments (or special school 
authorities) are in charge of delivering education.  In Chile, for instance, although municipal 
governments deliver both basic health services and primary and secondary education these 
services are largely financed by the national government, which is also responsible for ensuring 
that minimum national standards are met in all municipalities.  
14. Applying this line of thinking to the ‘project cycle’ commonly associated with 
infrastructure investment, one might end up placing  the ‘policy’ responsibility for ensuring that 
appropriate technical standards are met with one level of government, the primary regulatory 
(and likely some financing) responsibility with another, and the responsibility for actually 
delivering such services  with a third.   In the case of water, sewer and refuse collection, for 
example, one level of government might have responsibility for project design and management 
of water quality and waste disposal projects, another level of government with making provision 
for adequate water quality and quantity as well as environmentally sound wastewater and 
disposal services, and a third with operating the delivery system including waste collection and 
disposal, and maintenance of the water-sewer infrastructure.  In their attempt to develop a 
general framework,  Boadway and Shah (2009) argue the assignment of  water, sewer, refuse, 
and fire protection entirely to local governments (the lowest level) but suggest that responsibility 
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for policy and service delivery for other expenditure functions  should be divided among 
governments as illustrated in Table 2.
6
  
 
Table 2. The Traditional Theory of Infrastructure Expenditure Assignment: An Illustration 
Function Policy, 
standards, 
oversight 
Provision, 
administration 
Production, 
Distribution 
Comments 
Water, sewer, 
refuse,  
fire protection 
L L L,P Primarily  
local 
benefits 
Police S,L S,L S,L “ 
Parks  
and recreation 
N,S,L N,S,L N,S,L Benefits and 
costs vary in scope 
Highways, roads N,S,L N,S,L S,L,P “ 
Education, health, 
social welfare 
N,S,L S,L S,L,P Transfers in kind 
Natural resources N N,S,L N,S,L,P Promotes regional 
equity, common market 
Fiscal policy N N,S,L N,S,L,P Coordination possible 
Regulation N N,S,L N,S,L,P Internal common market 
Foreign direct 
investment 
N,L L P Local infrastructure critical 
Source and Notes: Extracted (including comments) from Boadway and Shah (2009, 134-35). N=national 
government, S=state (provincial, regional) government, L=local government, P=private or non-governmental. 
15. In practice, the unbundling of expenditure responsibility differs from country to country.  
Expenditure unbundling is common, but not a full proof solution to the assignment problem.  
Most countries provide a central and a local government list of service responsibilities, 
sometimes in great detail.  However, there often is a concurrent list that makes matters murky.  
The result can be great confusion about who is responsible for what, and much overlap.  For 
example, rural local governments’ welfare programs in Karnataka state in India are overlapped 
by 8 central government programs and 47 state government programs (Rao, Amar Nath and 
Vani, 2004).  
16. Three aspects of this brief summary of the traditional approach deserve close attention in 
the present context. First, the argument for local control depends not only on beneficiaries being 
local, as emphasized in Table 2, but also on local control being more likely to meet local needs 
and, ideally, on local users being able and willing to pay the costs. Only when local governance 
institutions ensure in an accountable way that those who benefit and pay are also those who 
decide what is done should all aspects of infrastructure decisions be assigned to local 
governments. Strictly earmarked user charge financing (including an appropriate intertemporal 
dimension) meets this standard but general fund financing, even if entirely local, will do so only 
when governance institutions are both strong and fully accountable.  Many developing countries 
do not have such institutions – or perhaps, in some cases, may have conflicting local institutions 
                                                          
6. They of course recognize that in some cases it may be more efficient to contract out many aspects of the 
construction and management of projects as well as service delivery itself to private providers, although it should be 
noted that such contracting may increase the regulatory – and perhaps, in some instances, even the financial – 
burden on the relevant governments. 
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(e.g. traditional, appointed, and elected officials) -- so even when all benefits of public sector 
activity are realized (and even paid for) locally, it is not always as clear as the conventional 
approach suggests that all aspects of the provision of such services are necessarily best provided 
locally.  
17. Secondly, with respect to the important ‘shared’ infrastructure responsibilities mentioned 
in Table 2, the appropriate local component depends on clearly understanding who benefits, how 
much, and when -- and again it is critical to tie together the financing and expenditure sides of 
the infrastructure budget (including O&M).  Not only does this require careful consideration of 
‘spillovers’ or ‘externalities’ (network, interurban, etc.) but it is also critical that there be 
adequate horizontal and vertical coordination, cooperation and burden sharing between affected 
jurisdictions.  Similar concerns often arise even with critical aspects of such ‘local’ activities as 
water, sewers, and refuse disposal as well as such ‘point’ investments as new schools or health 
centers.  Few developing countries are likely to satisfy these conditions, so again the guidance 
provided by theory may not always be as clear as the traditional literature suggests.  
18. Infrastructure projects can never all be lumped in one group and treated symmetrically 
and in the same way. Even with respect to economic infrastructure, for instance, big projects 
such as intercity highways are quite different from small ones such as village to market roads not 
only in scale and complexity of design (as well as the need to fit the project within a national 
perspective) but also in financing, execution and operation (maintenance). Small ‘purely local’ 
projects of whatever character can and should be left primarily to local decision-makers both to 
decide and to fund (including funding from general transfers and borrowing).  The latitude for 
error (e.g. corruption) may be greater with such small projects but the consequences of such 
errors are (and should be) largely borne by those who make them.  Much the same may often be 
true with respect to ‘point’ projects such as the design and location of a particular health center 
or school.  Mistakes can and will be made; but so long as those who make them bear the costs 
they have a strong incentive to get it right. Large network projects, on the other hand, both 
because of their broader externality effects and because of the sheer magnitude of their technical 
and financial demands usually require both support and guidance either from higher levels of 
government or perhaps from cooperating jurisdictions at the same level (although the appropriate 
design of such inter-governmental agreements is beyond the scope of this paper)  
19. Thirdly, even with respect to purely local infrastructure, localities require an ample tax 
base and/or ample access to capital markets to be able to access the lump sums needed to 
undertake most infrastructure projects.  By definition, infrastructure has an important temporal 
dimension and it is critical that capital financing be timed and provided in the ‘right’ way if the 
right projects are to be carried out in the right places – even when in principle it should be solely 
local governments that decide what is right, albeit perhaps subject to ‘standards’ of quality, 
quantity, and access established by higher levels of government and presumably subject also to 
some monitoring and evaluation by them.  Once again, few developing countries seem to provide 
a promising environment for the effective implementation of such ideas.  
20. The solution of the assignment problem with respect to infrastructure decentralization 
suggested in the traditional literature is thus simple in principle but considerably more complex if 
examined in detail.  The simple principle is what is sometimes called subsidiarity.  Decentralized 
provision of the infrastructure needed to fulfill local expenditure responsibilities should clearly 
be the responsibility of local governments. In some instances, restructuring subnational 
government borders or reassigning functions to different levels of subnational government may 
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be essential to achieving efficient decentralization.   In other instances, the most efficient way to 
proceed may be establishing some sort of ‘special district’, although, as noted below, the 
effective governance and operation of such special-purpose governmental units can turn out to be 
surprisingly difficult to resolve (Berry 2009).  An additional complication arises because in 
principle, since capital assets provide services over their sometimes long lives the most efficient 
and equitable way to finance such infrastructure is often through borrowing.  However, since in 
most developing countries local borrowing is subject to various regulatory and quantitative 
restraints in practice, especially when combined with the less developed capital markets in most 
countries, much local infrastructure ends up being financed by capital grants (or subsidized 
loans) from higher levels of government or even foreign donors.  
21. More broadly, one cannot consider decentralization and infrastructure in isolation from 
the critical issues raised in the ‘second-generation’ fiscal federalism literature with respect to 
decentralized governance in general (Oates 2005; Weingast 2006). As this literature shows, local 
responsibility and accountability is crucial in any decentralization program if it is to be incentive-
compatible. Without good local governance in a good intergovernmental system, local provision 
of infrastructure is likely to be far from the theoretical ideal.  The appropriate long-term solution 
is not, however, to shift responsibility to levels of government that are unlikely to deliver 
anything better -- and may even from the perspective of local consumers do worse -- but to 
improve local governance institutions by establishing workable and meaningful local 
accountability by fiscally responsible governments.  To do this, local governments need to have 
control over adequate resources for which they are fully accountable to those who provide them, 
whether local citizens through user charges and local taxes (including those servicing capital 
debts) or higher levels of government that provide grants or subsidized loans or private financial 
institutions that provide infrastructure loans. Even if decentralization is perfectly designed, some 
failures -- breakdowns of service delivery, payment arrears, even extreme insolvency – are likely 
to occur in some places, so that there is always a need not only for the central government to 
maintain a sound macroeconomic framework (e.g. with respect to subnational borrowing) but 
also to develop and, if necessary, implement, the equivalent of a ‘bankruptcy’ takeover of failed 
local governments.  
22. The requisite balance between assigning expenditure responsibilities to a decentralized 
governance institution that is just large enough to encompass the immediately relevant 
externalities while at the same time taking adequately into account the interests of all those 
affected (e.g. those in the areas where the refuse is dumped, buried or burned) rather than just the 
interests of such specific groups as shareholders or public sector workers is not easy to attain.  
Finding an expenditure delivery arrangement that passes this test becomes even more difficult 
when it becomes necessary to align ‘who pays’ with ‘who benefits’.   
23. Two other factors drive a wedge between the theory of assigning infrastructure 
responsibility, and the practice.  One is the inherent complication of the matter.  Imagine trying 
to unbundle education expenditures into the various activities, and then developing an operating 
definition of an activity such as  “standard setting”.  And then there are requirements that the 
benefit zone for certain infrastructure services be defined.  Finally, there is politics.  Unbundling 
may be a good idea for finding the right level of government to deliver a service, but elected 
politicians may be loath to give up control and may impose new mandates in the name of more 
efficient infrastructure service delivery.  
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From Principle to Practice 
24. The traditional assignment of expenditure responsibility suggests that much of the 
spending on infrastructure will be made by local governments.  About 1 billion people lack clean 
water and perhaps 3 billion lack access to adequate sanitation facilities.  The annual 
infrastructure expenditure required to meet simply this one essentially local need have been 
estimated at 2.0% of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa and 1.7% in South Asia, with about 40% of 
these amounts required for new investment and the balance for operation and maintenance 
(Estache 2010).  In practice, as Table 1 suggests for some Latin American countries, total local 
expenditures on all infrastructure have sometimes been less than these levels, and the share 
financed from ‘own’ revenues is smaller.  It is not surprising that in practice new investments 
made in even the most local of infrastructure in poor countries are largely financed by foreign aid 
and capital transfers.  Indeed, in many cases local ‘ability to pay’ is so low that even recurrent 
O&M expenditures, when made at all, are sometimes financed from such outside sources.
7
  
 A major obstacle in the way of assigning more responsibility for infrastructure to local 
governments is that most local governments in developing countries lack the financial, 
managerial, and technical ability to do the job. Two paths to solution seem possible: Kick it all 
upstairs to a higher level government, or work away at the long, grinding process of building up 
local governance structures and managerial capacity.  Since it is always quicker and easier to 
give money and to outsource tasks (e.g. via public-private partnerships – PPP – of various sorts) 
than to build up the institutional structure needed to enable local people to do the job themselves, 
the short horizons under which aid agencies and national governments operate ensure that they 
usually choose the easy way.  In Bangladesh, for example, the national Local Engineering 
Department essentially centralized local investment.  By following this path, however, although 
probably improving the technical efficiency of projects and although usually enthusiastically 
supported by local governments glad to be freed of the need to tax their own people, local 
autonomy was significantly undermined.  The result is that (1) local people have little or no 
ownership in the asset, so they tend to run it down rather than maintain it properly, that (2) they 
still lack most of the capacities needed to do it right anyway, that (3) the asset provided may not 
be what local people really want, and that (4) the whole cycle is likely to continue as long as 
outsiders are willing to pay. A similar system of centrally controlled infrastructure investment 
existed in Indonesia during the 1970-2000 period.  However, this was replaced with a 
decentralized system in 2000 and the responsibility for choosing and implementing infrastructure 
projects began to shift to elected local governments.  
 
  
                                                          
7. When provincial or state governments are removed from this calculation, the vertical imbalance observed in 
most countries is larger.   
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Preferences 
25. Preferences for capital projects will vary across regions within a country because of 
differences in the economic base, differences in the existing quality of infrastructure services, 
and differences related to urban population densities.  The idea that local familiarity and 
information can lead to better project selection and implementation is both generally accepted 
and supported by some country studies (e.g. Fiszbein 1997; Faguet 2004).   The demand for local 
control of infrastructure spending is high because the benefits are more readily identified by 
voters than is the case for many government outlays:  neighborhood residents are more likely to 
get excited about better water supply or a new street lighting system than they are about an 
increase in public employee wages, the preparation of a new master plan, or improved tax 
administration services.  This kind of anecdotal reasoning leads some to the conclusion that 
decentralized infrastructure responsibility should improve allocative (economic) efficiency, by 
attuning provision more closely to local preferences.  One example is some recent research 
showing that giving responsibility for water supply to local governments rather than public 
enterprises increased the quality of the output in Colombia (Bird 2012).   
26. Other evidence suggests that local control may also lead to increased overall levels of 
infrastructure spending (Estache and Sinha 1995; Boadway and Shah, 2009).  A recent careful 
econometric study in Europe, for example, found that decentralizing revenue authority to 
subnational governments definitely increased their investment in economic infrastructure, 
without reducing their ‘social’ investment (Kappeler et al. 2012).  Although the political 
attraction of investing in highly visible public works is obvious, and the economic outcomes of 
such projects may also be positive, legitimate questions may still  be raised about the relative 
effectiveness of such programs in terms of poverty alleviation compared to, say, conditional cash 
transfers (McCord 2012). Even in this respect, however, some evidence suggests that 
appropriately locating such ‘geographic capital’ (Jalan and Ravallion 2002) may have significant 
impacts on improving the access of the poor to markets, work and improved welfare (Majumder 
2012).  As Fiszbein (1997) noted some years ago, for example, poor people in an isolated 
mountain village may quite rationally choose to employ increased resources in improving market 
roads rather than primary education or whatever planners in the capital city may think is best for 
them.  
27. But are such potential efficiency gains from decentralization always or even often 
captured?  There are a number of reasons why they may not be, starting with the possibility that 
the local population may not have a vote which allows them to express preferences (and they 
also may not have a creditable exit threat), as in the cases of China, Vietnam or Nepal.  In China, 
for example, subnational governments have considerable discretion in making infrastructure 
decisions, but their political leaders are appointed and are accountable upward.  Infrastructure 
accomplishments have been remarkable in China, but it is not clear how much of this is driven 
by local preferences (Dollar and Hofman 2008). Bird et al. (2011) discuss a study of some 500 
villages which indicates that relatively little attention was paid to local preferences in making 
decisions about local expenditures in China.  
28. Even if there is local voting, decision making about public spending may have been 
captured by powerful interest groups within the community, such as local politicians or 
community organizations, or by central ministries.
8
  The process of selecting and designing 
                                                          
8. Berry (2009) provides a detailed account of the extent to which special-purpose local governments in the US 
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capital projects may not be weighted in favor of the preferences of the local population (Peterson 
and Muzzini 2005), and the procurement process may be corrupt and inefficient.  Government 
structure itself may be an impediment in cases in which the large size of provinces and cities 
make the benefit flow from capital investments all but  invisible to individual households.  
29. Some of these obstacles to capturing the potential efficiency gains from fiscal 
decentralization can be overcome or at least ameliorated.  One way is to provide for sub-
municipalities within large urban areas and to give them some degree of decision making power 
and budget.  This will allow for implementation of small scale projects at the neighborhood 
level, and might provide a stronger voice for neighborhood populations in the selection and 
design of larger capital projects.  Examples of this are the barangay governments in metropolitan 
Manila and the extensive use of locally-based benefit funding of investment projects in some 
Colombian cities (Bird 2012).  
30. Another way to do a better job of capturing the benefits of decentralized infrastructure 
spending is to monitor client satisfaction with infrastructure services.  The use of surveys to gain 
some information on citizen perceptions about the quality of services delivered can be an 
important input to identifying new infrastructure needs and maintenance needs.  While this is 
often done in the case of recurrent expenditures with household surveys and report cards, it is 
less often done with respect to infrastructure (Peterson and Muzzini, 2005).  
 
Technical Efficiency 
31. Welfare gains from the decentralization of responsibility for infrastructure services can 
also result when services are produced at lower cost. One important way to lower costs is to 
deliver services more efficiently. A recent study in Ontario, Canada, for example, reports that 20 
percent of treated water is ‘lost’ in the distribution system before it reaches consumers (Herstein 
2012).  Such leakages through technical failures (as well as simple theft) are often much larger in 
developing countries and might be lowered when providers are more directly responsible and 
responsive to consumers, although there seems to be a paucity of empirical evidence bearing on 
this point.  One must also consider the technology used to produce and, especially, maintain, 
services; for instance, in rural areas pumps that can be repaired locally may be preferable to more 
modern equipment that requires more expert servicing just as schools that can be built with local 
labor and materials may be cheaper to construct and maintain than those that meet the latest 
specifications sent from the experts in the capital.  On the other hand, sometimes many 
infrastructure inputs may be more efficiently ‘outsourced’ to central (or private) design, 
production and procurement, provided adequate attention is paid to local conditions and 
preferences.  
32. Some of these points may be illustrated by an interesting recent project in Ahmedabad, 
India, to improve public transit by building a new Ahmedabad Bus Rapid Transit Service 
(ABRTS).   This project seems to be surprisingly successful in its first years (National Institute 
of Urban Affairs 2011) for a number of reasons.  First, its designers paid close attention to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
have been ‘captured’ by such groups as developers, other business interests and public sector workers. The history 
of municipal infrastructure development around the world is replete with similar stories of elite capture: see, for 
example, the account in Briggs (1996) of city development in the UK in the 19th century, when most infrastructure 
was financed by (subsidized) private firms. 
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experience elsewhere with similar projects, both successful (e.g. Bogotá) and unsuccessful (e.g. 
Delhi).  Second, in both the design and the implementation phases, extensive efforts were made 
to consult not only with customers (actual and prospective) but with such ‘stakeholders’ as 
competitive modes of transport. As a result, substantial efforts were made to turn competing into 
complementary (feeder) modes.  Moreover, close attention was paid to the specific urban context 
in which the system was to operate, by establishing routes that would reduce  congestion, and 
minimizing  conflict about religious sites.  In addition, an extensive ‘pilot’ operation was carried 
out to test the system, and this led to significant improvements.    For example, the initial trial 
buses had metal seats which (unsurprisingly in the Indian context) turned out to be too hot for 
comfort and were therefore replaced by others before the system was finally launched.  Involving 
local people in all stages of the project cycle, not just by securing their agreement and approval 
but by actively involving them in identifying and initiating projects (what most needs to be done, 
and where), in project design (exactly where, and in what way) and even to some extent 
execution and operation (including, perhaps, using local labor where feasible) as well as in 
continually monitoring and evaluating services.  
33. For capital intensive services, the presence of economies of scale rules out some 
functions for decentralized assignment , such as railways and national trunk roads.  .  The cost of 
delivery by small area governments would be prohibitive for such services. But for most capital 
projects, the right level to assign expenditure responsibility and the extent to which local 
governments are ‘right-sized’ with respect to taking advantage of economies of scale (and scope) 
remains an open question (Fox and Gurley, 2006).  
34. Also debatable is the extent to which local governments take advantage of economies of 
scale.
9
 The empirical evidence is, at best, mixed. Byrnes and Dollery (2002), for example, 
reviewed research on economies of scale in the UK and the US and concluded that only 8 
percent of the studies found evidence of economies of scale in local government, 29 percent 
found evidence of U-shaped cost curves, 39 percent found no statistical relationship between per 
capita expenditure and population size, and 24 percent found evidence of diseconomies of scale. 
Studies that analyzed specific services (e.g. fire, housing) also showed mixed results.  On the 
whole there is not strong evidence of economies of scale with respect to most services once 
municipalities are much larger than 20,000-40,000 or so in population.
 10
 This does not mean that 
there are not size effects or that per capita expenditures do not fall as the scale of local 
government operations increases.  More likely it reflects the difficulty of separating the pure 
effects of scale on government costs from the effects of everything else.    
35. Economies of scale depend on the service in question and the units of measurement -- 
such as the jurisdiction size or the size of the facility. Hirsch (1959), for example, estimated cost 
                                                          
9. Much of the following discussion is based on Slack and Bird (2012). 
10. There are problems with the methodology used to measure cost and output (Byrnes and Dollery 2002). In most 
studies, expenditures are used as the measure of cost and population is used as the proxy for size or scale. Population 
may not be the best measure for this purpose. A larger population may mean greater need for expenditures but the 
characteristics of the population will also influence need. For example, a municipality with a large proportion of 
elderly will have different expenditure needs than one with a younger population of the same size; an urban 
population will have different expenditure needs than a rural population.  The density and geographic distribution of 
population may also be an important factor affecting both needs and costs. Furthermore, population does not reflect 
the non-resident population that visits a local government area and uses services. With respect to the measurement 
of cost, expenditures are not always the best proxy because they not only include costs but also reflect quality of 
services and possibly wasteful expenditures. Few studies of economies of scale include service levels. 
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functions for police services, fire services, refuse collection, water, sewage and education and 
found that expenditures per capita declined with the quantity provided for water and sewage 
(perhaps unsurprisingly, given the very heavy infrastructure component of such services) – but 
that there was no similar decline for other urban services generally provided by local 
governments in the US. For some services, expenditures per capita actually rose as output 
expanded, indicating that there were diseconomies of scale. Other studies that have estimated 
cost functions have similarly found economies of scale for hard services such as water, sewers 
and transportation but generally not for such soft services as police, refuse collection, recreation 
or planning (Bird and Slack 1993). Hard services are capital intensive, so large government units 
can more readily make the substantial capital investments needed to extend the water distribution 
system or build a least unit cost size sewage treatment plant (Bahl and Linn 1992). Other 
services, such as policing, are highly labour intensive and hence unlikely to show significant 
economies of scale. Presumably much the same can be said with respect to other labour intensive 
services like social services, education, and to some extent even health.  
36. Recent studies in both Canada and Finland, for example, have found little evidence of 
economies of scale in large municipalities. Found (2012) analyzed economies of scale for fire 
and police in 445 municipalities in Ontario, Canada from 2005 to 2008. He found that fire 
services exhibited U-shaped costs with a cost-minimizing population of approximately 20,000 
residents. Police services also exhibited U-shaped costs with a cost-minimizing population of 
about 45,000 residents. In Finland, Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta (2010) reported on a 
number of studies of the effects of municipal mergers on per capita expenditures and found the 
results to be mixed, with the biggest cities showing relatively low cost efficiency with respect to 
basic welfare services. Other studies in Finland that focused on specific municipal services 
(health centres and schooling) found the optimal size of the municipality to be somewhere 
between 20,000 and 40,000 people (Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta, 2010).  
37. As important as economies of scale (and scope) are economies of density (Bel 
forthcoming). For example, a recent study of annexation that analyzed 952 U.S. cities (with at 
least 10,000 people) that annexed other municipalities between 1992 and 2002 found efficiencies 
from increasing land area but only if the annexation was accompanied by higher densities 
(Edwards and Xiao 2009). If densities are lower following annexation, per capita expenditures 
may increase or decrease depending on the relationship of the change in land area to changes in 
density. The authors found that service delivery and administrative efficiencies are achieved with 
high density developments but compromised with low density developments that are spread out 
and more costly to serve.  
38. The question of economies of scale aside, there is some support for the argument that 
decentralization can lead to more cost effective outcomes for capital projects.    It can be argued 
that the cost of production is cheaper using local labor and materials, and avoiding the 
bureaucratic costs of managing a project from the center.  There is some evidence to support this 
argument, though the results are far from conclusive (Peterson and Muzzini 2005).    But this 
cost advantage does not hold in all countries.  For example, The World Bank (2009a) reports that 
subnational government spending for roads in Colombia is expensive and wasteful.  However, as 
Bird (2012) argues, it appears that this result reflects in part the unclear nature of the initial 
assignment of functions (which led to continuous disputes about which level of government was 
responsible for what when it came to roads) and in part the confusing way in which roads were 
financed.  When, as in Colombia, all three levels of government are involved in financing an 
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activity but the two subnational levels receive most of their funding from the national 
government through several different channels, not only is the “ownership” of (and hence 
responsibility for) roads further confused, but the diverse and volatile set of funding sources 
makes it exceptionally difficult either to invest sensibly or to maintain investments properly once 
made.  
 
Externalities 
39. When the delivery of a service leads to impacts on households that reside outside the 
boundaries of the jurisdiction, the lower tier governments will underspend (or overspend) 
because they will only account for local benefits and costs in their budgetary decisions.  Because 
the social costs and benefits due to spillover effects are ignored, society will not achieve as high 
a level of welfare as would be the case if the service had been assigned to either the regional or 
even the national level.  Such functions are not good candidates for delivery by a subnational 
government unless the area served can be expanded so that the externalities can be internalized, 
or, the government can arrange for payment by non-residents that would compensate for the 
benefits received.  
40. For purposes of working out the assignment of each function to different levels of 
government, it is necessary to estimate the benefit (cost) zone for each expenditure function.  
This is mission impossible because nearly all functions delivered by government impose external 
effects yet, rational public policy reform requires identification of the degree of the spillover 
effects and estimation of the costs of internalizing these.  The analysis for each function is not 
likely to result in precise estimates for these benefit zones, but it may often be good enough to 
guide the expenditure assignment decision for each infrastructure service.   
41. The end result of this exercise will be to assign responsibility for every infrastructure 
function to either local, provincial or central government.
11
  Sometimes, the external benefit or 
cost zone is so great that only central government responsibility will do. This will be the case if 
the service in question is one that benefits or burdens the entire national population (e.g., 
defense) or one in which there is a strong interest in maintaining national standards (education or 
the social safety net). In some cases, the external effects are deemed to be small enough to be 
ignored.  
42. As a rule, however, benefit and cost spillovers related to the provision of infrastructure 
services generally relate to an area smaller than the entire nation, especially in larger countries.  
Provincial or state level governments might be the right choice for delivery of functions such as 
inter-municipal roads and watershed management.  Sometimes externalities may be internalized 
by assigning functions to an even smaller jurisdiction: for example, water supply, mass transit 
and urban planning might be best assigned to metropolitan area-wide governments, although 
such governments all too often do not exist, have the wrong powers assigned, or fail to have the 
appropriate boundaries (Bahl and Linn 1992).  
                                                          
11. Actually, if such an exercise were done seriously, it would likely end up prescribing a different geographic 
‘benefit’ level for every public sector activity and sub-activity – or perhaps even for every geographic locality.  As 
noted earlier, however, such a proliferation of special service districts is seldom a good idea. 
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43. Various institutional arrangements may be used to address the spillover effects that might 
come with decentralization.  The process should begin with a clear identification of services 
where government perceives the externalities to be great enough to reject assignment to 
subnational governments.  Doing this homework correctly is not so easy, because of the 
difficulty of separating true external costs and benefits from the desire of central ministries to 
continue their control over certain programs.   
44. Second, infrastructure responsibilities might be unbundled into those subcomponents that 
do not spin off large spillovers and those that do.  In China, for example, the central government 
sets standards for the service, while the subnational governments are given responsibility for 
design and implementation of the project, and for financing.   
45. Third, central governments might use intergovernmental transfers of various kinds to 
induce subnational governments to correct for under spending on services with large 
externalities.  As discussed further below, these usually take the form of conditional grants.  
46. Finally, it might be decided that the lowest levels of government cannot handle the 
externality (or even the management) issues.  In this case, decentralization for certain functions 
is still possible in the form of special purpose public enterprises that operate on a local basis.  In 
some Indian metropolitan areas, certain local infrastructure services are delivered by single 
purpose metropolitan special districts, which would seem to address the externalities and 
economies of scale issues.  However, these parastatals are state owned, and so the responsiveness 
to local preferences is weakened (Mohanty, et al., 2006).  Another option is contracting for 
services, either to a private firm or to another local government.  While arranging some form of 
contracting between larger and smaller local governments for service delivery is an attractive 
alternative in principle, in practice it has turned out to be difficult to sustain such arrangements 
even in such well-governed and homogenous developed countries as Denmark and Finland.
12
  
 
 
Managing Infrastructure 
47. A major consideration as regards production efficiency is maintenance of the 
infrastructure.  A proper schedule of maintenance can markedly enhance the flow of services 
from capital assets and extend their useful life.  But maintenance is problematic under a 
decentralized system, for three reasons.  First, the base of local revenues that can be used to 
maintain the capital stock is limited.  Subnational governments raise only about 2.5 percent of 
GDP from own sources in developing countries (Table 3). Ingram, Liu and Brandt (forthcoming) 
estimate that the required annual maintenance costs for urban infrastructure in developing 
countries is equivalent to about 2 percent of GDP.
13
  Second, there is the question of whether 
local officials might be more prone to ignore maintenance in favor of more high profile 
construction of new infrastructure, or in favor of satisfying such other demands as public 
employee wage increases. There is also the question of whether from their perspective it may not 
be politically simpler to obtain new capital financing from higher levels of government than to 
                                                          
12. See the extensive discussion of such problems in e.g. Kim, Lotz and Mau (2010). 
13. An earlier study (covering rural and urban areas in developing countries), for the 2005-2010 period, estimated 
future maintenance needs in developing countries to average about 3.3 to 3.5 percent of GDP (Estache, 2006). 
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obtain more tax revenue from their constituents.  Third, as mentioned earlier with respect to 
roads in Colombia, the ownership of the public asset should be clear, lest there be confusion over 
which level of government is responsible for its maintenance. (World Bank, 2009a).  
 
Table 3.  Fiscal Decentralization: International Comparisons for the 2000s
a 
 Subnational Government Expenditures
a
 Subnational Government Taxes
a
 
Region Percent of Total 
Government 
Expenditures 
Percent of GDP Percent of Total 
Taxes 
Percent of GDP 
Developing 
countries 
18.8 
(16) 
5.1 
(20) 
11.4 
(16) 
2.3 
(20) 
Industrial countries 27.8 
(26) 
13.9 
(26) 
22.7 
(24) 
6.4 
(25) 
Source: IMF (various years) and estimates drawn from case studies.  
Note: Data reported are unweighted averages for the 2000s for years in which data are reported. 
a. The number in parenthesis shows the number of countries included in the comparison.  
 
48. Are there institutional and behavioral arrangements that might overcome some of the 
production efficiency disadvantages of subnational governments as regards the decentralization 
of infrastructure services?  Four possibilities might be suggested.  First, if a service has been 
assigned to subnational governments, limit interference from upper level governments that may 
increase costs.  Interference by higher level governments, for example by imposing mandates, 
should be limited to concerns about externalities, and perhaps the regular monitoring of 
maintenance. Mandates to spend a specified minimum share of the budget on economic 
development, or a specified maximum share on personnel, reduce local spending flexibility if 
they are effective, and are not easily enforced in any case.  Some countries (e.g. Colombia) 
commonly earmark significant portions of general intergovernmental transfers to ‘investment’, 
largely to restrain the feared dissipation of such transfers in current expenditures which all too 
often appear to line the pockets of local officials and their friends and relatives rather than 
provide valued services to citizens in general. It is far from clear that such earmarking achieves 
its objective.  Indeed, as noted later, there are both theoretical and empirical support for the 
contrary view that reducing earmarking is more likely to improve than to distort the allocation of 
local resources.   
49. Second, in the case of urban governments, expand the tax and user/benefit charge powers 
of subnational governments.  This should involve giving subnational governments access to a 
larger tax base, and autonomy for using this base. Increased provincial and local revenues would 
provide a funding base for infrastructure maintenance.  
50. Third, close the “back door” to infrastructure finance that is often provided by higher 
level governments.  In Mexico, for example, as much as 10 percent of intergovernmental 
transfers to subnational governments are given in the form of ad hoc grants to subnational 
governments (Bahl and Sethi, 2012).  This discourages local revenue mobilization and reduces 
the transparency of the system of intergovernmental transfers.  
51. Fourth, unbundle infrastructure services so that those sub-functions not characterized by 
clear advantages of centralization might be assigned to subnational governments.  Costs could be 
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reduced by disaggregating infrastructure expenditures into components, and making assignments 
on a basis of comparative advantage.  For example, while perhaps technical specifications 
required to ensure water quality might be a matter of national concern, the construction of major 
water supply and sewage lines (like interurban highways) may best be handled at the regional 
level, and local distribution lines might be the responsibility of local governments. As usual, 
such decentralization is likely to work better the more effort central governments put into 
establishing good ‘framework’ laws (e.g. on tendering and on intergovernmental agreements), 
into upgrading local capacity to deal with such issues, and into monitoring and evaluating 
outcomes.  In a sense, the issue here is similar to that raised below with respect to public-private 
infrastructure projects: in order to reap the full benefits of decentralization, some investment 
must be made into improving the regulatory framework at the national level and the executive 
capacity at the local level.  
 
Corruption 
52. A possible cost of fiscal decentralization is that it may lead to a greater rate of corruption. 
The thinking here is that the “closeness” between elected local politicians and the local political 
power structure breeds corruption. Both Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (1996) have presented 
this view as one of the dangers of decentralization.  There are other reasons why one might 
expect more corruption in a decentralized fiscal system. One is that the probability of successful 
stealing is increased by the weakening of central authority and monitoring.  Various students of 
corruption have placed the blame on the greater number of contacts with public officials in 
developing countries, on lower paid local public officials who have more incentive to steal than 
higher paid central officials, and on local government voters who have not yet learned to use 
their power to monitor and discipline their employees. All these problems may perhaps be more 
serious with respect to infrastructure where there more latitude for fraud, bribery, embezzlement 
and patronage than with respect to other, more ‘regular’ activities of local public officials and 
politicians. Moreover, local corruption, even if smaller in scale, may be particularly damaging to 
building ‘trust’ in government owing to the more visible inequalities that may result.   
53. Nonetheless, the case that corruption and decentralization are positively linked might be 
more impressionistic than real and the empirical evidence is divided on whether corruption costs 
are greater under a more decentralized system.
14
 Perhaps the common perception of high local 
corruption is unduly influenced by its greater visibility; corruption may be even greater with 
respect to centralized decisions if they are, as is sometimes true, even less transparent.   
54. We are not aware of comparable recent estimates of the cost of corruption in the 
infrastructure sector.  Such estimates are inherently difficult because data are scarce and because 
the conceptual model is not easily worked out.  In earlier work, however, Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2000) argued that corruption will lower infrastructure spending (fewer projects will be 
undertaken) while Mauro (1995) argued that corruption is more likely to raise infrastructure 
spending (higher unit costs).  Whatever the outcome, in the nature of the problem, information is 
scarce and unreliable, and helpful and feasible solutions short of a fundamental revision of the 
relationship between state and citizens are not easy to design or implement.  Politicians and 
                                                          
14. For reviews of this literature, see Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado and Boex (2007), and Boadway and 
Shah (2009). 
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officials who gain much of their income from exploiting their monopoly power to grant licenses, 
bestow contracts, or provide services are not likely to give it up easily.  Neither regulation nor 
privatization seems to provide complete answers to controlling the problem.   
55. As Estache (2006) notes, corruption is a symptom of a deeper underlying problem – the 
lack of political commitment and accountability.  For example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) 
have shown that simply financing local infrastructure through user fees rather than local taxes or 
intergovernmental transfers will reduce corruption, no matter how poorly local democracy 
works. As we discuss below, however, almost no infrastructure investment in developing 
countries is financed this way, and this situation seems unlikely to change soon.  
 
Capacity 
56. Subnational governments in developing countries often do not have the ability to design, 
build, and operate infrastructure, and are unlikely to even know enough to be able to ‘outsource’ 
the needed skills efficiently and effectively.  Many who write on the possible dangers of 
decentralization emphasize the poor quality of local administration in most developing countries 
(Prud'homme, 1995), although the variability even within specific countries makes 
generalization difficult.   On the other hand, there is at least some evidence suggesting that the 
quality of municipal management of public service delivery has improved in recent years in a 
number of developing countries (World Bank, 2009).  
57. While there is often good reason for concern about the capacity of subnational 
governments to deliver services, to a considerable extent countries get the local governments 
they want and deserve. Subnational politicians and officials, like those at the central government 
level, respond to the incentives with which they are faced. If those incentives discourage 
initiative and reward inefficiency and corruption it should not be surprising if local governments 
turn out to be corrupt and inefficient. Given appropriate incentives (in terms of heightened 
expectations of improved services from their constituents and access to resources for which they 
are politically responsible) even very small local governments have sometimes demonstrated 
significant improvements in administrative capacity within a relatively short time (Fiszbein, 
1997; Faguet 2004).   
58. As Fiszbein (1997) noted in an early evaluation of decentralization in Colombia, for 
example, when given the chance to do more when they received more resources after a 
constitutional revision, some – not all – municipalities took steps to improve their capacities.  
Some, for example, improved the skills of local officials through competitive hiring, some shared 
the services of professional staff with neighboring municipalities, and some undertook more 
training of municipal employees. Some municipalities also improved their capacity to carry out 
effective infrastructure projects.  One, for example, privatized road maintenance; another put 
private developers in charge of the construction of urban roads; others introduced computers to 
monitor water and sanitation services, shared equipment with others, and directly attempted to 
improve their capability of better managing municipal projects. While by no means all did such 
things, one result of the increased local engagement and ‘ownership’ was that surveys found 
most respondents trusted the local government more than the national government to deliver the 
goods and services that they wanted (Fiszbein 1997).  Most municipalities concentrated on roads, 
education, and water works. These priorities may not always have been what the central officials 
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previously in charge of these areas thought was most important, but since these were the needs 
local people perceived, these were the needs that at least some of the newly empowered and 
responsive local governments attempted to meet. Although over the succeeding decade of 
political turmoil and civil strife, much of this initial positive response appears to have faded 
away, even a decade later surveys continued to show that most Colombians were happier to pay 
local than national taxes, presumably because they felt they were, so to speak, getting more for 
their money (Acosta and Bird 2005).     
 
3. Reconciling Theory and Practice 
 
59. Theory tells us that efficient infrastructure is often decentralized infrastructure and that 
decentralized infrastructure should be efficient.  In practice, however, the underlying conditions 
needed to ensure that either part of this proposition holds are seldom met, and the result is that in 
too many instances not only is infrastructure not provided efficiently but the perceived failures of 
decentralized infrastructure lead to ‘corrective’ actions that prevent decentralization itself from 
realizing its potential advantages.  In most cases, the basic answer to these problems is to 
‘decentralize’ correctly which means, essentially, that three conditions are satisfied:  
 First, public sector functions must be sufficiently unbundled to ensure that they are 
assigned to the correct levels of government: both who is responsible for what and who is 
accountable to who for what must be clearly delineated.
15
 Clarity in assignment must be 
matched by accountability, in terms of both political democracy and transparency of 
operation, as well as by authority in terms of both the ability to manage expenditures and 
to determine (within limits) revenues.    
 Secondly, it follows that subnational governments must be adequately accountable in 
political, administrative, and financial terms both to those whom they are supposed to 
serve – their residents – as well as to those above them in the governmental hierarchy 
who may be responsible for developing policy, regulating how it is carried out, and often 
financing the activities of such governments.  Such ‘dual accountability’ is neither easy to 
design nor to implement. 
 Thirdly, essential to the successful achievement of both the previous conditions is the 
design and implementation of a sound intergovernmental finance  system, one that 
devolves appropriate revenue-raising powers to subnational governments, makes it 
possible for them to employ these powers effectively, supplements local finance when 
appropriate through well-designed transfers and provides adequate access to private 
sources of finance, particularly with respect to financing infrastructure investment.  We 
develop some aspects of this third point in the present section. 
  
                                                          
15. As mentioned earlier, experience suggests that it is important not to separate responsibilities for building 
infrastructure from those for operating and maintaining it in order to avoid creating distortionary incentives affecting 
both current and capital expenditures. 
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Improve Local Governance 
60. The efficiency of decentralized expenditure assignment for infrastructure is enhanced by 
local financing of these capital projects.  If full financing is by transfers from higher level 
governments and loans from state banks, then local officials will not be fully accountable to the 
voters for the quality of services delivered.  
61. Subnational governments in developing countries have access to three sources for 
financing capital expenditures: own source taxes, charges and other non-tax revenues; 
intergovernmental transfers; and various types of privatization schemes.
16
  In many countries, 
however, both the structure of these financing instruments and their implementation impede 
more efficient and equitable outcomes in the delivery of infrastructure services.  
62. Though there is no unified theory of revenue assignment that will allow identification of 
both the right level of subnational government financing and the right mix of revenue 
instruments to use (Martinez-Vazquez, forthcoming), as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) show, 
if infrastructure investment is financed by user charges, it is efficient.  More generally, to the 
extent that subnational government revenues are raised according to the benefit principle so that 
at the margin those who benefit from local infrastructure investment are those who finance it, the 
financing of infrastructure will be efficient. If locally-raised taxes will be paid entirely by those 
who benefit from local services, subnational governments will not overspend because they will 
not be able to export some or their entire tax burden to other jurisdictions (McLure 1998).     
63. This condition may seem strict, but in fact there are plenty of viable revenue options for 
covering this amount, including property and non-property taxation, and user and benefit charges 
(Bahl and Bird, 2008). Significant increases in subnational government revenue mobilization 
through such ‘good’ (local benefit) taxes and charges are feasible in many countries.    However, 
higher level governments in developing countries often are not willing to give up productive 
revenue sources such as income or general sales taxes to subnational governments.  Already 
strapped for revenues, they are hesitant to introduce competition for their tax bases, especially in 
the large urban areas where most taxes are raised, even when those are the subnational 
governments that both need and could use most effectively additional revenue from such sources. 
It is also often the case that elected officials in subnational governments are hesitant to push for 
new taxing powers precisely because it would ultimately force them into a position of greater 
accountability to their constituents.   They are happy to claim increasing shares of national 
transfers (or foreign aid) rather than have to face their residents with the need to pay higher 
taxes. All too often, when subnational governments do get the green light on taxation, they are 
usually both saddled with a limited choice of instruments and in effect encouraged to implement 
badly structured taxes that have undesirable efficiency effects (Bird 2006; Martinez-Vazquez, 
2012).   
  
                                                          
16. Countries may also receive capital transfers from external donors.  As Estache (2010) notes, aid-financed 
infrastructure is especially important in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa. However, we do not consider this 
source further in this paper: for a review, see Kharas and Linn (forthcoming). 
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User Charges   
64. For utilities in particular, user charges are the obvious and ideal source of finance.17   
Beneficiaries pay, and at full cost recovery, debt service and maintenance can be supported.  
User-financing of infrastructure ensures that those who benefit are willing to pay for what they 
receive, which is one of the best ways we know of ensuring that providing a particular service is 
worth what it costs.  However, there are two big problems with advocating user charge financing 
of infrastructure in developing countries.   
65. One problem commonly perceived is that many people are simply too poor to pay much.  
Too often this concern has resulted in too low prices that benefit mainly richer consumers.  Many 
governments grant subsidies and hold down tariff rates with the result that much less than full 
cost recovery – often even less than operating cost recovery – is the rule rather than the 
exception (Estache 2010).  The result is that the bulk of the effective public subsidy is captured 
by the few and fortunate and the resulting financial stringency ensures that not only do the poor 
continue to go without access to such essential services as basic water and sewage facilities but 
that the services that are provided are inadequately maintained, with resultant huge losses in 
supply.  Many schemes to overcome such problems have been put forward over the years but as 
yet few countries appear to have made a serious attempt to price public services efficiently while 
taking adequate account (e.g. through ‘lifeline’ or other tariff structures) of the need to provide a 
basic level of service to those who are unable to bear the full cost.
18
  
66. The second big problem with user charge finance is that no one likes it, especially when 
paying for what one gets is not now the norm.  People who are now receiving (often poor) 
service do not see why they should have to pay more and are unlikely to believe that they will, 
someday, receive something better for their money.  People who do not now receive services are 
unlikely to believe that if they agree to pay more than those now getting the service pay they will 
in fact get some benefits from doing so.  Politicians do not want to make current service 
recipients unhappy by making them pay and cannot easily sell ‘pay for what you get’ to people 
who have long seen others not paying.  While there is some experience that suggests 
neighborhood groups and small villages can and have sometimes agreed to finance small 
infrastructure works that will benefit them directly (Bird 1995), there is little or no evidence that 
anyone has been able to devise and implement a ‘corrective’ user charge structure to rectify the 
inefficient, inequitable, and ineffective fee structures now found in most developing countries.  
 
Property Taxes   
67. The property tax can be an efficient source of revenue for financing infrastructure.  In 
many cases, it finances infrastructure that enhances property values, and its revenue potential is 
large.  Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) estimate that the property tax yields 2.2 percent of 
GDP in revenues in industrial countries but only about 0.66 percent in industrial countries.  
When the family of taxes on real property is considered – transfer taxes and various forms of 
betterment levies --  the revenue potential is even greater, although the economic effects of 
                                                          
17. For further discussion of the appropriate role and design of user charges, see e.g. Bahl and Linn (1992) and 
Bird (2001).  
18. For an early review, see Bird and Miller (1989). Unfortunately, little has changed for the better since this paper 
was written. 
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transfer taxes leave much to be desired.   Moreover, the property tax has the virtue of being a 
levy that higher level governments do not want in their tax structure, either because they 
recognize the inherent advantage of local governments in administering the tax or because they 
recognize that the unpopularity of the tax goes well beyond its usually meager revenue yield.  
68. But in fact property taxes do not finance much infrastructure.  The political unpopularity 
of the residential tax often leads to a neutering of the tax base, sometimes by higher level 
governments who take credit for new exemptions while leaving local governments to deal with 
covering the revenue costs.  Moreover, the administration is often weak and always expensive 
(McCluskey and Franzsen forthcoming; Bird and Slack 2004).   
69. Subnational governments might also use property-based taxes to recapture the betterment 
from public investments, and in some cases this has yielded significant amounts of revenue (Alm 
2010).  In some countries, governments have been aggressive about using value capture methods 
in connection with infrastructure finance (Colombia) whereas in others (Philippines), it remains a 
largely unused source.  But even in the best of cases, such as Colombia, making a land value 
recapture scheme successful requires a great deal of technical and political investment (Bird 
2012).  
 
Other taxes.   
70. Subnational governments in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have mobilized significant 
revenues with subnational government taxes.  Argentinean and Colombian subnational 
governments use a form of turnover tax while Brazil taxes gross receipts from the sale of 
services.  But these taxes are highly distortive and serve as general revenues rather than as 
earmarked sources of finance for infrastructure.  Despite continued calls to modernize these sales 
taxes, or business taxes, they continue on in their present form.  The other option that is often 
considered is to abolish distortive subnational government taxes.  South Africa levied a 
combination gross receipts and turnover tax, but this was abolished by Parliament in part because 
of its weak structure and administration.  India’s octroi, a duty levied on goods entering the city 
for sale, is still a primary source of revenues for the Mumbai municipal corporation but has been 
abolished elsewhere in the sub-continent.  At least in these cases, the abolished taxes have not 
been replaced with an equally elastic local revenue source.  
71. Motor vehicle taxes would seem a good candidate for infrastructure finance, particularly 
for roads and mass transit.  All of the possible instruments -- licenses, motor fuels, parking fees 
and tolls -- could be structured as benefit taxes. Certainly the tax base is growing.  It is pointed 
out that for India, the motor vehicle population  increased   by 100 times between 1951 and 2004 
and has increased at an even faster rate in the 2000s (High Powered Commission, 2011, 56). On 
the administration side, the most difficult problem would be to convert the motor fuel tax to a 
destination basis, but this might be done using distributors’ shipment records until collection at 
the pump became a possibility.  
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Non-tax Revenues 
72. Like motor vehicle taxes, some non-tax revenues might be earmarked for infrastructure 
finance, even though the link between beneficiaries and burdens might not be so clear. Chinese 
metropolitan governments have been particularly innovative and have engaged heavily in land 
sales (long term leases) as a method of mobilizing resources for infrastructure finances.  For all 
local governments in China, land leases now account for about 30 percent of revenues (Wong, 
forthcoming).  Land sales have great advantages, namely the revenue potential and the low 
political cost (at least in China) of raising money this way.  But even in a unique setting like 
China, there are drawbacks, including the sensitivity of land revenues to the real estate cycle, and 
the riskiness of land value collateral for loans; the fact that the “easy money” might tempt 
overspending in local government budgets; the opportunity costs of converting land to urban use 
might be underestimated; and the fact that government-owned land is an exhaustible resource.  
73. A more difficult arrangement to assess is the earmarking of certain revenues for 
infrastructure development.  An example is Peru where natural resource revenues are distributed 
on a derivation basis and must be spent for economic development purposes (Canavire-Bacarreza 
et al. 2012; Martinez-Vazquez, 2012).   On the one hand, the goal of such a program is to replace 
the lost “heritage” of the region with a new infrastructure.  Management issues aside, there is 
some merit to this justification.  On the other hand, this kind of earmarking introduces a 
function-follows-finance model and provides little incentive for efficient spending.  
74. Even when there is not a separate system of capital transfers, some countries (e.g. 
Colombia) commonly earmark significant portions of general intergovernmental transfers to 
‘investment’, apparently in large part to restrain the feared dissipation of such transfers in current 
expenditures.
19
  It is far from clear that such earmarking achieves its objective.  Indeed, some 
evidence suggests that reducing earmarking is more likely to improve than to distort the 
allocation of local resources. The theoretical argument is simply the standard decentralization 
theorem: that allowing funds to be spent according to local tastes yields on the whole superior 
allocative and distributional results.  Empirical evidence in Norway (Borge et al. 2012) supports 
this argument strongly.   
75. Although one may perhaps doubt the relevance of this experience to the many developing 
countries in which ‘elite capture’ of local governments seems more likely, studies in Bolivia and 
Colombia (Faguet 2005) also point in this direction.  Most interestingly, perhaps, a recent careful 
study of the European Union (Kappeler et al. 2012) finds not only that revenue decentralization 
tends to increase subnational infrastructure investment Earmarking local revenues for 
infrastructure may make sense when there are good benefit (efficiency, equity, and management) 
reasons for doing so.  Small projects with well-defined benefit groups are most likely to meet 
these conditions.  In other cases, however, such earmarking may distort local preferences, 
exacerbate perverse incentives to build new rather than maintain existing infrastructure, and 
connect revenue sources with particular expenditures in ways that lack both economic and 
political logic. And, finally, there is the fungibility problem, i.e., it is not usually possible to 
separate the expenditure of the earmarked revenues from the expenditure of other revenues.    
  
                                                          
19. In Colombia, the potentially pernicious effects of such earmarking are perhaps mitigated to some extent by the 
fact that ‘investment’ is interpreted to include so-called ‘social investment’ in health, education and so on. 
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Intergovernmental Transfers   
76. Since subnational governments in most developing countries have very limited own 
resources and little access to private capital markets, to carry out costly public works as a rule 
they must rely heavily on grants (or subsidized loans) from higher- level governments. 
Depending on how the transfer system is structured, it may have a direct or an indirect effect on 
infrastructure finance.  
77. Most countries structure their transfer systems using some combination of three 
approaches.  The first is unconditional grants, which are an indirect way to provide infrastructure 
finance.  These funds can be used for maintenance of the public capital stock and for debt 
repayment, though the grant funds are not directly tied to either.   
78. In the eyes of lenders, the security associated with unconditional grants as the base for 
repayment is not strong.  Some countries attempt to get around this by making provision for 
these transfers to cover debt service costs by providing for an intercept arrangement or allowing 
these transfers to be pledged to repay debt, as has been done in Mexico (Revilla, 2012).  
Although many countries prohibit such arrangements, this approach to, in effect, ‘earmarking’ 
grants to service the debt on capital projects deserves careful consideration.  
79. A second approach is to make grants to local governments conditional on their 
expenditure for a particular capital purpose, often with no matching arrangement and in practice 
often with little supervision, either before or after the money flows.  Often these conditional 
grants are distributed on a formula basis, and in other cases they take the form of cost 
reimbursements.   
80. Capital grants to support local infrastructure projects, sometimes with a requirement of 
matching funding from local sources, are not uncommon but again the appropriate design of such 
transfers is not always easy to determine.  A number of questions need to be considered 
carefully: is one aim to rectify imbalances in the distribution of existing infrastructure (Ahmad 
and Searle 2006)?  To what extent are such transfers intended to improve economic efficiency – 
as is presumably the case with respect to most economic infrastructure such as transportation – 
or be equalizing e.g. by providing at least a minimum standard of such public services as 
education and health by providing hospitals and schools in particular areas (Josie et al. 2008)? 
Whatever the intended goal, in allocating such transfers between jurisdictions and in determining 
the appropriate matching rate, the nature of capital spending requires that concept of fiscal 
capacity should be expanded to encompass not just tax capacity but also the ability to access 
credit markets (Herrero-Alcalde et al. 2011).  
81. The third channel is more directly tied to infrastructure budgets.  This can take the form 
of a block grant for infrastructure services, on a matching basis.  This has been done in India 
where a large federal grant for urban infrastructure development and slum upgrading is allocated 
to cities on a matching basis (High Powered Expert Committee, 2011).   The program was 
introduced in 2005, and while it has succeeded in focusing increased attention on urban 
infrastructure issues, implementation progress has been slow (Rao and Bird 2011). South Africa 
makes use of a more formal municipal infrastructure grant, designed primarily to improve 
services in poor neighborhoods (van Ryneveld, 2007).  Brazil is another country where ad hoc 
grants are made to support specific projects.  
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82. If done in conjunction with increased local drevenue mobilization and cost recovery 
levels of user charges, a case can be made that any of these approaches to intergovernmental 
transfers can lead to a more efficient delivery of infrastructure services by local governments.  
Still especially conditional grants can be significantly improved in most countries in a number of 
ways. For example, the terms and conditions of such transfers might require subnational 
governments to prepare an adequate investment plan and an adequate maintenance plan, as well 
as an appropriate user charge policy. The governments receiving such transfers should be 
selected by a systematic process that pays attention both to need and capacity factors and to the 
economic evaluation (cost-benefit analysis) of the project in question. Adequate technical 
assistance should be made available to subnational governments to permit them to develop plans, 
arrange financing, manage construction, and operate the facility (or to contract out its operation) 
in the most efficient possible fashion. Finally, to ensure accountability as well as good outcomes 
the execution and operation of the grant-aided work should be monitored and evaluated, with 
periodic progress reports, field inspections, and formal evaluations of outcomes including 
consumer surveys.  
83. Of course, achieving all this is a bit of a counsel of perfection in the conditions of many 
developing countries. Nonetheless, as the early experience with ‘municipal development funds” 
(Davey 1988) demonstrated, if such conditions are not satisfied, the results of capital transfers 
and loans are unlikely to live up to expectations. Subnational infrastructure finance is inevitably 
greatly dependent on transfers from higher level governments.  These transfers may be efficiency 
enhancing when they take the form of conditional grants designed to correct for under spending 
on services characterized by externalities, but few such transfers are to be found in practice in 
part because the design of a conditional grant for infrastructure involves a great deal of 
guesswork if (as theory often suggests) one goal is to correct for under-spending as a result of 
not taking externalities into account.  It involves identifying a target for the optimal level of 
spending for the function that takes account of social as well as local benefits, as well as having 
some notion of the elasticity of demand for the infrastructure service.   Careful targeting along 
these lines is an essential ingredient of effective subsidy policy in resource-constrained countries 
but most infrastructure related transfers, perhaps understandably, take a far more general 
approach.  
 
Borrowing 
84. Borrowing is not itself a source of revenue but rather an efficient way to arrange payment 
for the purchase of public assets that have a long life.  By matching payment for the 
infrastructure with the time pattern of consumption of the asset, governments can immediately 
begin capturing  the returns from infrastructure investments while deferring the payments. But in 
the end, the loans must be repaid, either from the own source revenues of the subnational 
governments, from user charges, or from intergovernmental transfers.  The essential foundation 
of a sound subnational borrowing program is thus a sound subnational fiscal structure in terms 
both of access to ‘own revenues’ and a well-designed and stable intergovernmental transfer 
system. Still, loans are often both essential because they offer subnational governments a way to 
attract the large amount of funds necessary for financing the construction phase and in principle 
an economically efficient (and equitable) source of finance because the debt has to be repaid 
(from current revenues) during the life of the project, that is, while it is providing benefits to 
local residents.  
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85. But borrowing by subnational governments can lead to problems, as  students of local 
public finance have long argued (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996).  The revenue stream of local 
government revenues may not be large enough to sustain repayment but borrowing may go 
forward anyway in anticipation of some form of bailout.   This well-known moral hazard 
problem has led to over borrowing and to some form of bailout of subnational governments in 
Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and more recently in China (de Mello 2007; Wong forthcoming).  
Many countries attempt to control over-borrowing by subnational governments with various 
forms of fiscal responsibility legislation (Liu and Webb 2011), though these programs have met 
with varying degrees of success.  The problem with bailouts is that subnational governments 
learn that there is a way around the hard budget constraint, and they may return again to the 
strategy of overspending on infrastructure.  A good borrowing framework can head this off, but 
it may effectively close the borrowing window for those local governments who have the 
greatest infrastructure gaps.   
86. Bundling subnational borrowing – for example, by having regional entities borrow for 
smaller local authorities – may make sense on cost grounds.  Similarly, packaging subnational 
borrowing in some form such as a national infrastructure bank may make sense when financing 
flows to projects that, although the responsibility of subnational governments, are of national 
significance e.g. as part of a national network of roads or electricity distribution. In most cases, 
however, loans from such public financial institutions are extended on subsidized terms and are  
in effect  a variant form of matching grant. Although hopefully the lessons of  unfortunate past 
experiences with such ‘soft’ funding have been learned, as yet there appears to be no magic 
institutional way to avoid the hard necessity of first establishing subnational finances on a sound 
and sustainable basis so that at least some of them – probably the largest and better off –are, 
when financial markets are sufficiently developed,  creditable candidates for private sector 
financing.      When subnational governments are charged with an important role in providing 
infrastructure, many of them will need both technical and financial support to play that role 
adequately but it is important to ensure that financial resources do not arrive in ways that distort 
the incentives facing subnational decision makers in ways that may damage both the provision of 
infrastructure and, more broadly, governance at the subnational level.
20
  
 
Public-private partnerships   
87. Much the same can be said with respect to the interest in  public-private partnerships 
(PPP) during  the past two decades.  During this period, many  urged increased private 
involvement both to increase the efficiency of service provision and provide badly needed 
resources to support urban infrastructure investment.  .  Klein (2012) argues that both of these 
justifications need to be qualified.  Private sector “resources” would come from user charges, 
which also be realized by local governments if levied at cost recovery rates.  And, the private 
sector expertise may be a step up from local government  capacity, but would come with a higher 
cost of financing.   
88. In addition, there are questions about how PPP will deliver services, for example, full 
privatization with various degrees of regulation, or some form of contracting for operation.  The 
                                                          
20. For a recent study emphasizing the importance of appropriate incentives, fiscal and otherwise, with respect to 
establishing and sustaining sound decentralized governance, see Faguet (2011). 
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build-operate version is attractive in part precisely because it offers a way to get facilities built 
without incurring highly visible government debt. It would be fair to say that the high hopes for 
PPP in the 1990s and early 2000s never materialized.  As yet, PPP has added relatively little to 
urban capital financing in developing countries (Annez 2008; Alm 2010).   Moreover, less than 
10 percent of the investment has been in the high priority water/sewer sector and an even smaller 
share in the form of full or partial privatization (Menard forthcoming).     Most PPP has been 
focused on the energy and telecommunications sectors (Klein, 2012).  Relatively little has been 
attracted to the higher priority water and sewer sectors, mostly because of pricing risks.  In some 
instances where private capital has been attracted to these areas, e.g., in Bolivia Venezuela and 
Argentina, conflict-laden and generally considered a failure, with the result being in effect ‘re-
nationalization’ of projects initially carried out by PPPs.  
89. Opinions differ sharply with respect to both the merits of PPP arrangements and how best 
to design and implement them.  In a recent assessment of the literature, for example, Merk et al 
(2012) conclude that a critical feature (if a PPP is to minimize project costs) is that the contract 
should be ‘global’, that is, that a single contractor is responsible for managing the whole project 
in order to reap full economies of scale and scope and provide maximum incentives to invest and 
innovate.  In contrast, Siemiatycki and Frieman (2012), considering urban transit projects in 
which a major issue is how to allocate ‘ridership (demand) risk’ argue that ‘unbundled’ contracts 
that exclude facility operation are often preferable both because they are likely to attract more 
competitive bids and to lower the cost of private sector borrowing. The contradictory nature of 
these recent assessments stress the importance of the specific context and institutional and 
regulatory settings (e.g. the relative development of financial markets and who sets user charges) 
as well as the detailed specifics of PPP contracts in determining outcomes.  
90. Even when a transit project is carried out entirely by the public sector, of course, similar 
regulatory and financial factors are critical.  China, for example, has in recent years carried out 
huge urban infrastructure investments through what may perhaps be thought of as a Chinese 
variant of PPP, where both parties to the contract are really ‘public.” To illustrate, the extensive 
Beijing metro system, like many other projects in China, was financed primarily by bank loans to 
a local investment corporation - the Beijing Infrastructure Investment Corporation - created and 
controlled by the local government (Su and Zhao 2006).  Since the national government strongly 
encouraged local governments to carry out such investments and banks to finance them in doing 
so, presumably the banking sector in effect considers such loans to be guaranteed by the state.  In 
addition to this implicit subsidy, loans to local investment corporations have generally received 
an explicit subsidy in the form of an interest rate about 10 percent less than the normal rate of 
long-term debt. In reality, however, most local borrowing is directly serviced from local 
revenues which are in turn highly dependent on revenue from leasing land.  Such revenue is 
highly sensitive both to property values and to the amount of land sold: in 2011, for instance, 
Beijing’s revenue from this source decreased by 36 percent from the 2010 level.  Even if one 
assumes that the whole rapid transit system has been and is optimally designed, constructed and 
operated, current plans to expand the metro system further in the next few years and a flat-fare 
policy that already requires an annual operating subsidy (and will need an even larger one in an 
expanded system) make it likely that the sustainability of the financing model used to build not 
only the Beijing metro but also much of the extremely impressive development of urban 
infrastructure in China in recent years is an example of what Wong (forthcoming) calls “riding 
the tiger.” It may soon require careful reconsideration and in all likelihood substantial adjustment 
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-- unless perhaps the urban real estate sector can realistically be expected to continue to boom at 
pre-2010 rates for the next few decades.  
91. To take a quite different, and perhaps more widely applicable example, Ahmedabad’s 
Bus Rapid Transit System, financed in large part (35 percent) by a national urban development 
program (the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, JNNURM), in part (15 
percent) by the State of Gujarat with the balance (50 percent) coming from local sources 
(including a dedicated urban transport fund), was developed and implemented  through nine 
separate PPP arrangements negotiated between the special public corporation (Ahmedabad 
Janmarg Limited) created for the purpose and various private providers.  These arrangements 
covered everything from the major system investment (bus stations, corridor, flyovers as well as 
buses) to housekeeping and parking (National Institute of Urban Affairs 2011).  The resulting 
system has both substantially improved ‘people transport’ in the city and has, like the somewhat 
similar earlier ‘Transmilenio’ BRTS in Bogotá, won national and international acclaim as a 
model that seems worthy of emulation elsewhere. Some aspects - notably dedicated funding 
sources for urban transit systems – have already appeared in several North American cites in 
recent years: Vancouver, for example, collects a number of fees and taxes that are dedicated to a 
regional transportation authority, as do Chicago, Los Angeles, and Salt Lake City (Institute of 
Municipal Finance 2012).  
92. There are of course risks associated with public-private partnerships. For the private 
sector, for example, there are risks that the regulatory framework and/or pricing commitments 
could change and cause delays in the project. Annez (2008) and Ingram, Liu and Brandt 
(forthcoming) argue that the inherent riskiness of urban investments in water and sanitation are 
the main constraint to increasing the flow of private capital.  There is a weak record of full cost 
recovery, and often an unwillingness of local governments to stand behind the kinds of tariff 
levels and regulatory arrangements that would be necessary to attract private investors.  In many 
countries there is what Pethe (forthcoming) describes a “trust deficit” between public and private 
sectors that has sometimes resulted in episodes like the Bolivian ‘re-nationalization’ mentioned 
above. For all of these reasons, the World Bank (2009, 32) points to “few positive results” in 
efforts to attract private financing of municipal services.  
93. For the public sector, there is the risk that services provided may not be what the public 
wants.  There is also the risk that the private partner will fail, or insist on a recontracting, and the 
public sector will have to take on the obligation in full.  How successful such arrangements are 
from the perspective of either partner depends very much on the details of exactly how the 
contractual arrangements are structured and how the risks are shared.
21 
Given the weak 
institutional capacity of subnational governments in many developing countries, it seems 
unlikely that they will have a strong hand in negotiating such contracts.  The Indian High 
Powered Commission on Urban Infrastructure (2011, p101) puts it well.  “Weak governments 
cannot rely on private agents to overcome their weaknesses nor can they expect to make the best 
possible bargains for the public they represent.”  
  
                                                          
21. For detailed exploration of the structuring of  PPP arrangements,  see Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2010).  
For a skeptical view of the range of opportunities to exploit such possibilities, see Menard (forthcoming). 
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4. Two Special Issues: Metropolitan Areas and Regional Equity 
94. In many countries, there are specific problems that call for special consideration, and 
perhaps for a different approach to infrastructure delivery.    We discuss two such problems in 
this section: (a) how best to organize infrastructure provision in metropolitan areas and in their 
polar opposite – remote and sparsely populated rural areas – and (b) how to take account of 
concerns about ‘regional equity’ in the allocation of infrastructure funding and projects.  
 
The Need for Asymmetry 
95. Some policy makers in developing countries would argue that in principle political 
institutions should presumably be structured to treat all citizens as equally as possible: they 
should be symmetrical.  On the other hand, if economic institutions are to produce relatively 
equal (symmetrical) outcomes they must often be structured asymmetrically: they must 
recognize explicitly the very different conditions existing in different regions and localities.
22
  
Big cities – metropolitan areas – are different from other urban areas to call for a different 
treatment as regards fiscal decentralization.   At the other extreme, small, remote municipalities 
located in sparsely populated regions are also very different from other local governments, and 
also call for a special set of financing and service delivery arrangements.   
 
Metropolitan Areas 
96. The expected rate of migration to urban areas over the next two decades will strain the 
present network of urban infrastructure and generate new demands that will be difficult to 
absorb.  The number of megacities (population greater than 10 million) is projected to increase 
from 19 now to 27 in 2025, when about 10 percent of the world’s urban population will reside in 
these cities.  Of the projected 27 mega-cities, 21 will be in less developed countries.  By 2025, 
there will be 48 cities with populations between 5 and 10 million, and three-fourths of these will 
be in developing countries (United Nations 2008).  Ingram, Liu and Brandt (forthcoming) 
estimate that annual urban infrastructure costs will be equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP for 
new infrastructure and 2 percent for maintenance.  The estimates for India are that to meet 
projected needs, urban infrastructure investments (excluding maintenance expenditures) must 
increase from current levels of 0.7 percent of GDP to 1.1 percent by 2032 (High Powered Expert 
Committee, 2011). The policy questions that governments in developing countries must answer 
is which level of government will deliver this infrastructure, with what degree of autonomy,  and 
how will it be financed.   
97. For many (most) large urban areas, heavy infrastructure demands will come from three 
directions.  Natural population growth and new migrants will impose demands for expanding, 
repairing and modernizing the capital facilities to accommodate the larger population.  Industry, 
especially the smart growth sectors will demand an infrastructure that will enable them to be 
more competitive in the international market place.  Transportation and IT support will be 
featured in their investment wish list.  Third, it is expected that there will be about 2 billion slum 
                                                          
22. A good discussion of the symmetry-asymmetry issue in the South Africa context is in Schroeder (2003). 
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dwellers in urban areas by 2050 (United Nations 2008) and services to provide a basic standard 
of living will be needed.  
98. Efficiency considerations might point toward decentralization in the provision of services 
in metropolitan areas.  Governments in the metropolitan areas have the advantage of knowing the 
needs and preferences of their population and of their business sector.  But the problem is very 
complicated.  Decentralization of expenditure responsibility to metropolitan areas is one thing, 
but decentralizing to the local governments within the metropolitan area may be quite another.    
The local units that operate within the metropolitan areas may not be large enough to efficiently 
deliver the infrastructure services.  The underlying problem is the fragmentation of governance 
within large urban areas (Bahl forthcoming).  
99. Local government structures in metropolitan areas typically emphasize one of three 
approaches to governance.  
 A political fragmentation approach where governance is divided among numerous 
small municipalities, each operating with some degree of autonomy.  This approach 
features home rule and is the approach taken for example in the Mexico City 
metropolitan area (2 states, a national capital district, and over 50 municipal-type 
local governments), and the Sao Paulo metropolitan area (39 municipal governments 
operating with relatively little required coordination.   
 A functional fragmentation approach where the municipal government structure is 
overlaid by some special districts or public enterprises that provide infrastructure 
services that cover the entire metropolitan area.  The emphasis here is on technical 
efficiency in the delivery of infrastructure services.  Such an approach is taken in 
Mumbai, with state-owned parastatals serving as the metropolitan area enterprises. 
 A metropolitan government approach where general services are provided by an area 
wide government with little by way of an underlying set of local governments.  The 
emphasis of this approach is on coordination in the delivery of services in the area.  
This would describe the approach taken in the South African metropolitan cities.  
100. In the case of a politically fragmented government structure, the devolution of 
responsibility for infrastructure services does not lead to efficient outcomes.  With the possible 
exception of the largest municipality in the area, the jurisdictions are often too small to capture 
the economies of scale necessary for production efficiency, and management skills might be 
limited.  And, the more fragmented the structure of government, the greater will be the problems 
with spillover effects from local investments in infrastructure.  Finally, local governments in 
fragmented metropolitan areas are not likely to have broad-based taxing powers that would 
provide the basis for supporting a large debt issue.  If there is to be assignment of responsibilities 
for infrastructure services to subnational governments in urban areas, and if there are to be 
broad-based taxes in the system, the better approach would be either metropolitan government or 
public enterprises whose service district includes the entire metropolitan area. On the other hand, 
as mentioned earlier, within this general framework there may be ample scope for 
‘neighborhood’ (or small municipality) works to be developed (and largely financed) by user-
based groups through schemes capturing the value increments generated by such projects.  
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Remote Localities 
101. Rural local governments are a different case, which also may call for a differential 
treatment.  They are small, often remote, and with very limited resources.  The literacy rate may 
be low, financial management capacity of the local governments may be quite limited, and there 
may be little if any capacity to design or deliver anything beyond the most basic infrastructure 
project.  Own source revenues may be all but non-existent because of the weak tax base, and user 
charges will be well below cost recovery levels because of the high degree of poverty in the rural 
area.  
102. China is one of the most rapidly urbanizing countries in the world.  Despite the rapid out-
migration of recent decades, however, over 600 million people still live in its over 700,000 rural 
villages, many of which are located in remote and sparsely populated areas.  For these villages 
(and the townships in which they are situated) to become more viable, accountable, and at least 
moderately effective in providing basic public services, significant efforts and reforms seem 
needed.  Similarly, in India, another huge country with a very large rural population, experience 
to date suggests that centralized provision of rural services has never worked very well and that, 
so far at least, more decentralized provision has also not worked very well.     While 
generalizations are dangerous with respect to such matters in either of these huge and 
heterogeneous countries, it does seem clear that rural service delivery remains a major problem, 
and a very different problem from the metropolitan problems discussed earlier.  
103. One part of the solution to both problems is similar, however.  In metropolitan areas, 
some kind of region-wide authority is clearly needed to deal properly with area-wide 
infrastructure problems.  In rural areas also, some kind of higher-level ‘regional’ authority is also 
often needed, though not to deal with regional problems of spillovers since there are few such 
problems in non-contiguous small and geographically separated localities.  Rather the need is to 
provide the technical, administrative, and financial support needed to deal with the problems of 
providing basic local services in remote, small, and usually very poor communities.
23
 For 
example, small remote communities are unlikely to have an adequate tax base to be 
economically viable, to have adequate administrative capacity, to finance major capital 
expenditures, or even to take advantage of economies of scale (Kitchen and Slack 2006).  In 
these circumstances, infrastructure investments required to provide basic local public services 
must either be provided directly by a higher-level government  or at least financed (with perhaps 
some limited in-kind or other local cost-sharing) by such a regional structure, whether a county, 
a second-tier municipality, or some kind of special district.   
 
Regional equity 
104. Whether the devolution of expenditure responsibility for infrastructure services is 
efficient is not the only question to be asked.  Fiscal disparities among regions in developing 
countries can be quite large, and the quality of infrastructure usually is most wanting in the 
poorest places.  A national infrastructure decentralization policy will if anything widen fiscal 
disparities because of the greater revenue mobilization capacity of richer jurisdictions and their 
                                                          
23. In some instances, the economically most efficient thing to do might be simply to move people to some other 
area but this is seldom politically possible and, at least in the case of border regions, not even politically desirable.  
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superior capacity to deliver services.  In addition, as Albalate, Bel and Fageda (2012) show in 
detail for the case of Spain, and as many ‘provincials’ suspect is true with respect to countries 
everywhere, centralized investment programs (e.g. in network projects) tend to be heavily related 
to proximity to the political capital.  Although infrastructure investment seems to be more an 
instrument of centralization than of regional redistribution policy, it is nonetheless also 
commonly a vehicle for ‘regional policy’ in the sense of providing ‘something for everyone’ and 
perhaps even more for those who have less.  
105. One might take two views about decentralized infrastructure responsibility in this 
context.  One is that the ability to choose capital projects and to deliver them is just as important 
in small communities as in large urban areas.  Devolution can work.  There is a good bit of 
evidence that in some cases small local governments can produce small (local) public works 
projects at a lower cost and can design them so that the probability of sustainable operations is 
relatively high.
24
  The problem is financing.  In this case, decentralization with financing by 
intergovernmental transfers for smaller projects, and vertical programs for the delivery of larger 
projects, may be a viable strategy.   
106. On the other hand, much of the evidence on successful devolution of infrastructure is 
about small, even rural settlements.  There are some questions about the how much of this 
success can be transferred to larger settlements or even to the rural sector more broadly.  If it 
cannot, then infrastructure disparities might widen a great deal under devolution.  In this case, 
the right strategy may be an asymmetric system in which the larger urban places have heavy 
responsibility for delivering and financing their infrastructure, with infrastructure in smaller, less 
dense, and often poorer localities being delivered primarily by higher level governments.  
 
5. Conclusions and Guidelines for Policy 
107. Theory tells us that an appropriately structured fiscal decentralization can lead to a higher 
quality of infrastructure services than will a fully centralized system.  If the assignment of 
expenditure responsibility is correct and if the capacity to deliver services is in place, consumer-
voters will be empowered to express their preferences for infrastructure services, services will be 
delivered with appropriate technologies and at lower costs, there will be more willingness to pay, 
and a better record of maintenance of public facilities.  
There is plenty of evidence that following the theory can lead to some of these outcomes.  But, 
there is also plenty of evidence that a decentralized infrastructure structure fails the quality test.    
The problem is that the theory is based on a set of assumptions that may not fit the real world in 
developing countries, and/or that successful infrastructure decentralization requires supporting 
governance and finance system changes that most developing countries are not willing (or able) 
to make.  However, from this theory, and from the practice in developing countries, we might 
draw out some policy rules that could support a successful decentralization of appropriate 
infrastructure services.  Although every country is different, every locality is different, and every 
infrastructure project is different, there are some general principles about institutional and fiscal 
practices that can improve both how well decentralized governments carry out infrastructure 
projects and how well decentralization in general will function.  This review of the theory and 
                                                          
24. See, for example, the review of the evidence in Peterson and Muzzini (2005). 
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the practice suggests seven policy reform areas issues that can lead to more success in the 
delivery of some infrastructure services by local governments.  
108. The first is the need for a comprehensive scope of infrastructure policy reform.  
Reformers should take a comprehensive view of infrastructure decentralization, and should 
consider and fit together all the components necessary to make the system work.  This is because 
the argument for local control depends not only on beneficiaries being local, but also on local 
control being more likely to meet local needs and, ideally, on local users being able and willing 
to pay the costs. Only when local governance institutions ensure in an accountable way that those 
who benefit and pay are also those who decide what is done should all aspects of infrastructure 
decisions be assigned to local governments.  A corollary to this is the importance of getting the 
structure right in order to benefit from management improvements.  Improved procurement and 
financial management systems, and the like, will not achieve their important goals if the 
responsibility for a capital expenditure is assigned to the wrong level of government.  
109. The second is a clear and appropriate assignment of expenditure responsibility for 
infrastructure.  Public sector functions must be sufficiently unbundled to ensure that they are 
assigned to the correct levels of government: both who is responsible for what and who is 
accountable to whom for what must be clearly delineated.    While unbundling can be a decided 
improvement in that it recognizes the comparative advantages of each level of government in 
infrastructure service delivery, it can lead to complication and confusion, and must be reviewed 
regularly.  Clarity in assignment must be matched by accountability, in terms of both political 
democracy and transparency of operation, as well as by authority in terms of both the ability to 
manage expenditures and to determine (within limits) revenues.  
110. Third, local governments must be adequately accountable in political, administrative, and 
financial terms both to those whom they are supposed to serve – their residents – as well as to 
those above them in the governmental hierarchy who may be responsible for developing policy, 
regulating how it is carried out, and often financing the activities of such governments.  Such 
‘dual accountability’ is neither easy to design nor to implement, and will require fiscal planners 
to walk a fine line.  On the one hand, unbundling schemes such as allowing higher level 
governments to set standards and require creditable compliance tests call for an upward 
accountability by local governments.  So do conditional grants.  On the other, too much 
expenditure mandating by higher level governments can take away the local autonomy that is the 
key advantage of fiscal decentralization of infrastructure.  Ultimately, the local governments 
must be accountable to its voting constituency.  Mandates and conditionalities should be held to 
the test of accommodating externalities.  
111. Fourth, the revenue mobilization efforts of local governments in most developing 
countries needs to be increased if local governments are to take on more responsibility for 
delivering infrastructure services.  In particular, the larger urban local governments need to be 
given access to stronger tax bases and encouragement to reform the tax base to which they 
already have access (namely the property tax).  User charges must be ratcheted up significantly 
so that they approach cost recovery levels.  Arguably the major impediments to increased 
revenue mobilization by local governments is the absence of  incentives that are great enough in 
magnitude to offset the aversion of local politicians to tax increases.  Here the reform agenda 
might include closing off the option of ad hoc capital transfers to cover infrastructure financing 
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by local governments, the provision of incentives for increased local effort, and conditional 
grants that are designed with a mixture of clearly specified conditions and local matches.  
112. Fifth, borrowing and public private partnerships have great potential as methods of 
financing capital projects, and in the latter case as a managerial approach to operations.  
However, governments in developing countries must be more realistic about the prospects of 
reaching either of these sources for efficiently financing local government infrastructure.  
Borrowing, even under a reasonable regulatory framework, can be part of the long term 
infrastructure finance plan for local governments, but only if this is supported by a level of local 
revenue mobilization and transfers that will make principal and interest repayment, and 
maintenance, viable.  Public private partnerships are even more problematic for developing 
countries.  For revenue generating projects where the user charge phobia of local governments is 
not so great (e.g., telecoms, parking garages, etc.),  private capital can be drawn.  But for the high 
priority services such as water and sewer, private investors will probably not buy in until they 
see a reasonable prospect for cost recovery and for operations that are not hamstrung by the 
regulatory framework.  The Indian High Powered Commission on Urban Infrastructure (2011, 
p101) puts it well,  “Weak governments cannot rely on private agents to overcome their 
weaknesses nor can they expect to make the best possible bargains for the public they represent.”  
113. Sixth, there is a strong case for an asymmetric approach to decentralizing infrastructure 
delivery and finance.  The larger urban areas have a greater capacity to plan, deliver and finance 
infrastructure services than do smaller and more rural local governments.  The regime for 
infrastructure decentralization should recognize this, perhaps by limiting local government 
participation until they could grow into the responsibility.  Such a guideline will lead to more 
responsibility for delivering  infrastructure in larger urban areas, as well as more responsibility 
for finaning infrastructure with own source revenues.  Rural local governments will continue to 
rely more heavily on vertical programs of higher level governments.  This may harm the 
equalization objectives of government, and it may slow down the capacity development of rural 
local governments, but it also may increase the productivity of total infrastructure spending.  
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